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ABSTRACT
Income inequality in the United States has been growing since the 1970s. How-
ever, this economic phenomenon has not been widely discussed in public discourse
until recently. Scholars suggest that income inequality has major consequences for
representation and redistribution policy, however, no scholar has examined what are
the driving factors behind how American public opinion is formed on income inequal-
ity. This study examines how economic factors, political factors, and media inuence
may potentially help form American public opinion on income inequality. With sur-
vey questions from 1971-2012, we create a public mood measure to determine how
liberal or conservative the public feels towards income inequality.
The results show that the American public takes almost no cue from actual
economic conditions when forming their mood towards income inequality. The party
of the president is the only signicant factor in what causes the public to feel more
liberal or conservative towards income inequality. Cues from the president and the
media have no eect on public opinion either. Even when accounting for the liberal
or conservative tone of presidential rhetoric in a year, we nd that the party of the
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1. INTRODUCTION AND LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1 Introduction
In September 2011, thousands of people gathered in Zuccotti Park in New
York City. This protest group had no specic demands from government and claimed
to only want to restore the inuence of the 99% over the 1% in politics and economics
(Schwartz 2011). This protest was the base of the Occupy Wall Street movement
and thousands remained in the park camping and discussing the Occupy movement.
Eventually the movement moved across the United States and even abroad. The
Occupy movement grew out of public concern for income inequality in the United
States, as Washington bailed out failing international banks, common Americans
became concerned about what interests the government was protecting, those of the
ordinary man or those of the richest Americans.
Income inequality is not a new economic phenomenon in the United States. The
Gilded Age in America in the late 19th and early 20th century allowed business
men like John Rockefeller and Andrew Carnegie to amass a tremendous amount of
wealth, while most Americans lived in relatively impoverished conditions. Rockefeller
earned a total of $340 billion dollars in his lifetime, while the average American
family made less than $1200 dollars a year in 1890. Through policy changes, such
as income tax, and the eect of two world wars, income inequality in the United
States decreased, and was at its lowest in the 1940s and 1950s in the post war
boom. Beginning in the 1960s and 1970s, income inequality began increasing and has
continued to ever since (Piketty and Saez 2003, Shaw and Gaey 2012). Even with
increasing income inequality in the 20th centruy, the American public, researchers,
and political elites have largely been uninterested, in learning about, discussing,
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or solving income inequality. In 2004, the American Political Science Association
put together a task force to investigate how disparities in income may aect the
democratic process in America. This task force sparked a greater interest, among
academics, in what eect income inequality may have on not only the economic
conditions of the country, but also how the political system operates. In his 2014
State of the Union Address, President Barack Obama talked directly about the stark
dierences in income between the richest and poorest Americans, bringing discussion
about income inequality to the forefront in American news and media.
Many academic studies on income inequality focus primarily on how income in-
equality aects the political system through voter turnout, representation, and how
redistribution occurs (Bartels 2008, Kelly 2009, Ura and Ellis 2008). previous liter-
ature suggests implicitly that there is a kind of feedback loop to how opinions are
formed towards a political phenomenon. If the public starts with a specic opinion
towards a public policy, we would expect elected politicians to adjust their pol-
icy preferences and opinions to the preference of the public. Politicians are \single
minded re-election seekers" (Mayhew 1974), so from this, we would expect politi-
cians to move with public opinion in a specic policy area to increase their chance of
re-election. Once this policy choice is enacted, we can expect from previous research,
that the public mood will then respond, thermostatically, to the policy by moving
away from where their previous stance on the issue was (Stimson 1999). This feed-
back loop moves from public opinion to representation to policy to policy outcome
which then should aect an update in public opinion in congruence to the policy
change that occurred. Previous research on income inequality has addressed repre-
sentation, policy, and policy outcomes for redistribution, but not how the public's
opinions on income inequality are formed.
How is public mood of income inequality rst formed? When thinking of income
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inequality in this feedback loop, of public opinion and representation, is there a way
to determine what will move the public's mood? Economic factors should matter,
after all income inequality is at its core an economic problem. Income inequality,
however, is an abstract and sophisticated phenomenon. On sophisticated political
and economic matters, most Americans use knowledge shortcuts from political elites
and the media to form an opinion about a policy or issue (Zaller 1992, Kellstedt 2003).
Thus we would expect public opinion to move along with the policy sentiment of elites
and the increased attention to the topic. Previous research nds contradictions to
the idea that the president and media are rst movers in the opinion formation of the
American public (Canes-Wrone 2006 and Edwards 2009). The president, the highest
political elite, moves after mood waiting to gage public sentiment before choosing his
stance. Also, the media must choose carefully because stories may not gain traction
(and therefore prot) without general interest from the public.
In this study, an explanation for what drives the public's opinion towards income
inequality will be sought. What starts the feedback loop for the issue of income
inequality? No scholars who have studied income inequality, have determined where
public concern for income inequality originates or even if it is dynamic over time.
Determining the source of public mood towards income inequality, may help us un-
derstand not only this specic issue, but how the American public is informed about
abstract and complex economic phenomenon. This study will also bring to light
when the American public sees income inequality as a problem for the nation and
what drives their concern.
1.2 How is Public Opinion Formed?
The study of the formation of public opinion towards politics is a long standing
eld of research in American political science. In his seminal work, Philip Converse,
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found that the opinions of individuals were largely inconsistent and highly volatile
over time (1964). The idea of Americans as a largely uninformed electorate remained
the dominant theory in political science for most of the 20th century. In his 1992 book,
John Zaller found that people are not inconsistent, but have competing considerations
when comes to any given policy issue. These dierent considerations are simply
dierent ways that an individual has heard an issue discussed in the media or among
peers. For instance when thinking of unemployment, a person may consider a friend
who has recently been laid o, someone who they have seen on the news receiving
unemployment benets, and a homeless man who begs outside of their oce building.
Anyone of these considerations can be exploited by the media, and the most recent
\exploitation" will dictate how a respondent will express their opinions towards the
issue of unemployment. Zaller found that the media and elite rhetoric played a
large part in the considerations that were brought to mind when an individual was
prompted with a question about a certain policy area.
When examining what could determine the public mood towards income inequal-
ity, we can look at three major inuencers from what we know from previous re-
search: political elites, the media, and economic conditions. Economic conditions
should have a direct aect on how Americans feel about income inequality which is
an economic issue. Macro economic studies like Durr (1993) show that when people
are pessimistic about the economic future they are likely to be less favorable towards
big government. When economic times look good, however, people are more willing
to help support big government. So as inequality rises, Americans may try to hold
on to their earnings instead of favoring big government, which leads to more taxes.
However, Hayes (2013) nds that those who are doing well nancially are less op-
posed to government spending. These contradictory ndings could be due to an issue
of level of analysis considering Hayes looks at micro level data, but the contradiction
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is important to note. Diana Mutz in her 1992 study asks if Americans vote with
their pocketbook or sociothropically in presidential elections. Mutz nds that \at
the national level, personal and social level concerns remain virtually independent."
The way that that the American public thinks about national economic issues is
simply not inuenced by any personal economic experience.
Some of the literature, including Zaller, suggest that for abstract economic issues,
Americans use shortcuts from the media and political elites to learn about complex
economic phenomenon. Americans do not take time to learn about an issue for
themselves, so they take cues from partisan elites or pundits as to what opinions
they should form. Erikson, MacKuen, and Stimson (2002) nd that the public forms
opinions on the economy through what the media tells them about the economy, not
actual economic conditions or their own economic situation. If the American public
is getting cues about how to feel about policy issues from elites and media, then it is
pertinent to examine the existing literature on how rhetoric and the media can drive
or change public opinion.
1.3 Can Presidential Rhetoric on Income Inequality Move Opinion?
1.3.1 Presidential Agenda Setting
The president is elected with expectations that he will implement the policies
he advocated for in his platform during his campaign. These issues have been strate-
gically predetermined by the president or president to be (and his sta) as feasible
to be achieved once he assumes oce. Determining the agenda sets the stage for
what rhetoric the president will give to the public in his national addresses. Light
(1998) suggests that there are three incentives behind what issues the president will
choose to be on his agenda: electoral benets, historical benets, and programmatic
benets. The president will choose policies that the public will reward him for during
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elections, policies that give him historical signicance, and policies that are attractive
to the president's personal or political beliefs. Kingdon (1984), like Light, agrees that
\no other single actor in the political system has quite the capability of the president
to set agendas in given policy areas for all who deal with those policies" (25).
Kingdon suggests however that the president is cued by national mood on what
he should include on his agenda. Cohen (1997) contends that a problem must become
a social or public problem and the problem must be considered within the legitimate
scope of government in order to reach the president's agenda. Cohen also agrees with
the majority of the literature that the \president plays a critical role in shaping the
systematic agenda by aecting problem identication and issue polarization in the
mass public" (32).
1.3.2 Can the President Move Opinion?
Once the president has determined what will be on his policy agenda, he
must convey his policy preferences to the public, Congress, and the bureaucracy. A
large segment of the literature believes that the president is eective in moving public
opinion, and thus Congress, by speeches and other rhetoric that the president engages
in throughout his time in oce. However, most of the theories and hypotheses
supported by these scholars are found wanting in the data. Even though scholars
expect presidential rhetoric to matter, they nd little empirical support that it does
much to sway public opinion and policy.
The president, as the highest political elite, is likely capable of moving public
opinion and addressing his policy goals. However, Page and Shapiro (1984) question
the eect that presidential rhetoric has on the opinion of the American public. In
their analysis they nd that the president doesn't move public opinion, but not
because of a lack of trying, the president still addresses the public regularly, however,
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the public is either not listening or not responding (652). Page and Shapiro nd that
ultimately when a president is popular they are able to aect public opinion, but
when they are unpopular they have no eect on public opinion.
Cohen (1995) nds that public takes no notice of the actual substance of what
the president says, but just mere mentions of a policy increase the attentiveness of
the public to the issue. He nds that these slight leadership eects on opinion decay
by policy year's end. The results in the existing literature seem to suggest that
the president can move opinion, but not in any signicantt way. The rest of the
literature then focuses on the way the president can strategically use opinion and
what presidents are more eective at addressing policy through their rhetoric.
1.3.3 Strategic Presidential Rhetoric
If the president does not aect public opinion toward policy directly with
rhetoric, then why and how do they use rhetoric? Canes-Wrone (2006) and Edwards
(2009) both suggest that the president uses public opinion as the main indicator on
what he should address in his rhetoric. Instead of leading opinion, these authors
suggest that the president moves with the current public mood and exploits policies
that are already favorable in the public. If the president cannot move opinion, then he
will champion policies that are already popular in the public. Edwards suggests that
the president exploits existing opinion through framing and priming. He postulates
in his book that the maximum inuence a president can have (post-Reagan) is to
identify a policy question that already has a lot of public support and just draw
more attention to it. Canes-Wrone suggests that presidents go public for policies
that are already popular and then this leads to extra pressure on the legislature to
pay attention to the policy.
Edwards and Wood (1999) claim that the president is limited in his legislative
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agenda power, and thus must work hard to win over Congress. In this study, the
authors also suggest that the media is an important agenda setter for the public,
who then inuence elites. The authors look at the relationship of agenda inuence
among the media, the president, and the Congress. They nd that Congress and the
media do not respond to the president on foreign aairs. They nd that the president
does have some inuence on domestic issues but in the study this was specic to cer-
tain presidents and had the most eect during campaign seasons. Interestingly, the
authors nd that the media can have a strong driving force in inuencing the presi-
dent's agenda. This piece brings the media into consideration when thinking about
the president's strategy for his rhetoric. In her 2001 article, Canes-Wroneincludes
prior media salience as a control when examining the eect of presidential rhetoric
on the public, yet the media still plays a signicant eect in the modern era on how
politics are discussed and reach the mass public.
Even if presidents are strategic on when they go public, do their messages reach
the public? Young and Perkins (2005) study the eect that State of the Union Ad-
dress rhetoric has on public opinion towards the issue the president addresses. They
question if \the end of the Golden Age of presidential rhetoric has undercut the im-
pact of presidential rhetoric on public opinion" (1191). They nd that the president
could move public opinion during the \Golden Age", but in the cable age, presi-
dential emphasis on policies do not have an eect on public opinion. Especially for
economic policy, they nd that the public forms their own ideas about the economy
based on their own personal experience with current economic conditions.
Peake and Esbaugh-Soha (2008) note that the change in the nature of modern
media is likely to limit the president's ability to aect media attention to his policy
priorities. With these changes, is the president still able to increase attention to his
policy goals? The authors nd that the president can only increase media attention
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to economic policy a third of the time. Prior media attention to an issue diminishes
the president's agenda setting eect. If a issue has media attention and has a lot of
public opinion surrounding it, then the president's role as a leader for policy on a
issue is very small. Peake and Esbaugh-Soha also nd that the president is strategic
in what he chooses to address publicly. When the president addresses an issue that
has high public concern then the media is more likely to cover that speech. Although
the president may not be able to move opinion on a popular issue, he can increase
attention to him which can be electorally benecial.
1.4 Can the Media Move Opinion on Income Inequality?
It is well known that the media inuences what issues Americans think about
and how they think about these issues. Early studies done on media eects for
politics, examined how the media could eect votes for presidential elections and
presidential approval. Iyengar and Kinder (1987) conducted an early experimental
study that examined the eects that the media could have on what candidate a voter
would choose to vote for. They found that through framing, priming, and agenda
setting, that the media can change the publics intentions without changing their
underlying belief system.
Similar to the study of the eect of presidential rhetoric, we have to ask if the
American public is listening to the messages they receive from the news media. Er-
bring and Goldenburg (1980) nd that there is a dierence between \unsensitized
audiences" and \sensitized audiences" for what learning or priming comes from me-
dia coverage. They nd that those who are more sensitized to an issue, such as
unemployed individual watching a story on unemployment, are more likely to absorb
information given to them in the news. Whereas unsensitized audiences do not take
in new information that is given to them in general news stories. The authors con-
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clude that, \People have dierent notions of what is important to them, and they
tune in and out accordingly."
Bartels (1993) suggests that opinions are already too well dened in presidential
elections for the media to have any real change in opinion. However, when it comes
to more abstract policy issues, the media can be the primary way that people learn
about dicult topics and those topics or people that have little actual experience
with. Kellstedt (2003) nds that the media is a primary way that most Americans
form racial attitudes. When Americans think of a policy issue at the national level
they rely especially on the news media for their attitude formation on race. When it
comes to abstract or dicult policy areas, the public largely relies on the news media
to simplify and streamline the information that the receive about dierent policies.
Learning about economic phenomena at the national level is often too costly and
complex for the average American, so they rely on the media for that information.
1.5 What is Known About Income Inequality?
Many studies have shown that income inequality in the United States has
been increasing since the end of World War II (Piketty and Saez 2003, Shaw and
Gaey 2012). However the nature of what inequality means for American society
and politics has taken very dierent forms within the literature. Many scholars are in
agreement that inequality plays a direct role in representation. Larry Bartels (2008)
suggests that inequality creates an incentive for elected ocials to pay attention to
only the wealthiest income groups, those with inuence who donate to campaigns and
are active in the political arena. It has even been shown that the political preferences
of the rich align the most closely with actual policy implementations (Gilens 2009).
Hacker and Pierson (2010) show through the political history of party change in
the last half of the twentieth century, elected ocials have generally begun to move
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away from the politics of the middle and working class. They postulate that the
decline in unions have given the middle and working class few political organiza-
tions to work through. Instead, the Republicans have been able to pay attention to
big business while pulling in moral conservative votes from middle and lower class
Americans. Republicans vastly out raised the Democrats in campaign money from
the 1980s on. This has caused the Democrats to try and play fund-raising catch up
causing them to abandon their original electoral focus on their poor and minority
voting bloc, and instead to court auent liberal policy making such as environmen-
tal policy in order to receive campaign donations and please auent party members.
This fundamental change in attention to certain groups for electoral reasons, has left
the middle and lower class largely out of politics.
Lower income groups have little political voice and are often marginalized by
political actors and ignored in the policy making process. This means that policies
that could benet the poor are not implemented leaving the poor powerless and in
a vicious cycle where their policy preferences will continue to be ignored (Bartels
2008). Scholars worry that this leads to a fault in American democracy where a
specic group of American citizens are not represented by their elected politicians.
A subset of scholars (Ura and Ellis 2008, Soroka and Wlezien 2008) take an
opposing view of income inequality and claim that the policy preferences between
the top income brackets and the low-income brackets have virtually no dierence in
their policy preferences. These scholars contend that income inequality in the United
States does not threaten the representation of all Americans. If most Americans share
similar policy preferences then it is likely that these policies will be enacted. However,
this claim is contentious in the literature with rebuttals claiming that there are vast
policy dierences between income groups across dierent policy areas (Gilens 2009).
What do we currently known about how Americans form opinions about income
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inequality? Much of survey research shows us that Americans oppose big government,
but support spending in almost every policy area. Burak (2013) posits that this is
due to the values of economic individualism and the American dream in the United
States. Americans believe that hard work should be rewarded and inequality is a
natural process of capitalism. Burak (2013) nds that most Americans regardless
of what they earn oppose compensation caps for the richest Americans. Even those
respondents who believe that the highest incomes are too high are uncomfortable
with the idea of capping pay. This helps to give insight to the peculiar nding
that most Americans are rather accepting of economic and income inequality in the
United States regardless of their own income bracket.
Hochschild (1981) did a series of interviews with Americans in dierent income
brackets about income inequality within American society. She nds that those be-
ing interviewed believed in the capitalist economic model and that even the low
income participants are accepting of people who make high incomes and agree that
the wealthy deserve what they worked for. The low-income respondents also did not
believe in equal compensation across occupations claiming it would ruin competition,
and claiming that those who worked harder deserved to earn more. Wealthier sub-
jects in the study, claimed that they made more than enough to live and held feelings
that the poor in society should be helped, but not receive handouts. These interviews
lead Hochschild to the conclude that Americans hold dierent and competing ideas
and values about inequality in society.
Americans overall, regardless of how much they make, are not overly supportive
of redistributive policies. In fact, Kelly and Enns (2010) nd that as inequality
rises, both the rich and poor want less government and are more conservative in
their political views. This is contradictory and has lead many scholars to wonder
if the poor are able to link redistributive policies with their own nancial needs.
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Soroka and Wlezien (2008) and Kelly and Enns (2010) both nd that the poor are
knowledgeable about inequality and redistributive policy, but are still opposed to
government spending when inequality rises.
While this nding is not logical on its face, the literature does provide several
reasons for why this may be the case. First, both Bartels (2008) and Kelly (2009)
nd that inequality increases under Republican presidents. Republican presidents
and political leaders have an incentive to pit public opinion against redistributive
policies to keep their base ignited (Jacobs and Shapiro 2000). This may lead to an
overall disapproval of redistributive policies in times when inequality is in fact at its
greatest. Findings like this give credit to the legitimacy of this study. If the political
rhetoric is successful at causing income inequality to not be perceived when it is in
fact growing, then insight into perceptions and not just actual income inequality is
needed to understand when and why the public demands redistributive policy.
Many scholars worry that rising income inequality may lead to poor Americans
being underrepresented, as politics will be focused on the preferences of the rich
(Gilens 2005, Bartels 2008, Kelly 2009). Another faction of the literature suggests
that policy preferences across income groups are not very dierent. This suggests that
representation is not awed because policymakers are responding to the electorate as
a whole (Ura and Ellis 2008, Soroka and Wlezien 2008). Little work has been done on
perceptions of inequality, but we do know that Americans respond to bad economic
expectations and high perceptions of inequality thermostatically by becoming more
conservative in their political views and favoring less government (Durr 1993, Kelly
and Enns 2010).
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2. THEORY AND METHODS
2.1 Theory
How is public opinion towards income inequality rst formed? When thinking
of income inequality in the loop of public opinion and representation, is there a
way to determine what will move the public's mood? The public's mood towards
income inequality, after all, has important implications for how much government
redistribution citizens want and thus expect from their elected representatives. This
should lead voters to make dierent electoral decisions which will be reected in
redistributive policy. Scholars have already studied extensively how voters react in
times of income inequality (Kelly and Enns 2010, Soroka and Wlezien 2008). scholars
have also studied how income inequality changes representation (Bartels 2008). The
literature also makes it clear that Americans are tolerant of income inequality due
to deep rooted American values (Hochschild 1981, Burak 2013). Regardless of what
values allow Americans to be more tolerant towards income inequality, public opinion
about income inequality is dynamic and these opinions are driven by certain factors
that aect how the public \considers" income inequality.
Economic factors should matter, after all, income inequality is at its core an
economic problem. Income inequality, however, is an abstract and sophisticated
phenomenon. To learn about and form opinions on sophisticated political and eco-
nomic matters, most Americans use shortcuts from political elites and the media
to form their opinion about a policy or issue. We may nd then that actual eco-
nomic conditions have a slight eect on the public mood towards income inequality.
While Americans may have more of a grasp on tangible economic conditions such as
ination (price of milk goes up) and unemployment (personal experiences), income
14
inequality is an abstract phenomenon. Most Americans live in a neighborhood and
work with people who have similar incomes to themselves. And we know that even
if a person's next door neighbor buys a porsche, individual level phenomena do not
translate into people's attitudes at the macro level (Mutz 1992).
To look at what drives macro level opinion towards an economic phenomenon,
we need to examine macro economic factors. General economic conditions should
prompt Americans to either want more or less from government in terms of redis-
tribution. When economic conditions look pessimistic, we should expect Americans
to see income inequality as a wrong to be corrected and to want more from govern-
ment to x inequality. This idea is contested in the literature (Soroka and Wlezien
2008, Kelly and Enns 2010), however, when looking at general macro-level trends,
we should expect negative economic conditions to cause the American public to de-
mand more action from government. A complex issue like income inequality is not
something that should cause Americans to be more conservative when they are asked
about it as a problem alone. Income inequality will involve government redistribu-
tion to correct, it cannot be done simply by the natural processes in the economic
system.
It is more likely that Americans take cues about income inequality from the media
and political elites when they form opinions towards income inequality. Presidential
rhetoric has increased signicantly since the beginning of the modern television era.
The president also obtains the highest political oce which should mean that his
rhetoric reaches most Americans and is highly salient for the public, whether they
approve of the president or not (Cohen 1995). However, existing literature suggests
that the president does not really move opinion and rather strategically addresses
existing opinion and rides a public opinion \wave" when addressing the nation (Page
and Shapiro 1984, Edwards 2009, Canes-Wrone 2006). Regardless of this, it can be
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expected that when a president addresses an issue to a national audience that it will
raise salience among the public. If a president addresses a topic in major national
address, it will receive media attention and this too will increase the salience of the
topic in the American public.
Stories about income inequality in the media should cause the most signicant
increase in concern for income inequality among the public. Americans may not grasp
the state of current economic conditions and many Americans can choose to tune
out of presidential rhetoric, however, most Americans cannot avoid highly salient
media news stories. They permeate through the news and into personal discussions
where most Americans learn about a topic, especially an issue that is unfamiliar or
complex (Kellstedt 2003). The media is the most accessible source of information
for Americans and an increase in media attention about income inequality should
increase concern. The media is also likely to frame income inequality as the rich
getting richer at the expense of the middle and lower classes. This should prime most
Americans to think of income inequality as a concern that needs to be rectied.
Public opinion on income inequality is often placed in a loop of representation
and redistribution in the literature. When Americans are concerned about income
inequality, they then want policies to correct for inequality which means that their
elected ocials should enact policy changes that lessen or address income inequality
if they want to stay in oce. What we do not have a clear idea of is where opinion
on income inequality comes from. Using data on economic and political conditions,
presidential rhetoric, and media attention to income inequality, this study will at-
tempt to determine what drives Americans to have concern, or not, about income
inequality.
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2.2 Why Use the Public Mood Towards Income Inequality?
This study will look at public mood towards income inequality over time.
Looking at a snapshot of opinion on income inequality does not give a complete
picture of what may drive these opinions, but simply what may have caused concern
at one point in time. An overtime analysis allows dierent social climates, politics,
and economic conditions to aect opinion, and gives more insight into what really
drives opinion towards income inequality. Studying public opinion about income
inequality over time using existing survey data is dicult. Unfortunately, a single
survey group, newspaper, or other source have not collected consistent data using
the same question from year to year. In her book, McCall (2005) is limited to three
time point from the General Social Survey in her analysis because they are the only
consistent questions that exist. While having consistent questions is ideal for this
type of analysis, it severely limits what we can learn about large over time variance
in public opinion towards income inequality.
In order to accomplish this study without having consistent measures of the pub-
lic opinion towards income inequality, a public mood measure of income inequality
is used for the dependent variable. James Stimson created a public mood measure
in his 1991 book, Public Opinion in America, to attempt to capture a general trend
in public opinion across dierent social and economic policy areas. Stimson found
that by indexing these dierent areas together, a common conservative/liberal tide
in American public opinion existed, he dubbed this the public mood of the nation.
The American public, and thus their mood, either moves liberally or conservatively
depending on dierent political and economic factors. Like other thermostatic mea-
sures used in political science, once the public becomes liberal or conservative, mood
will slowly ebb in the opposite direction. For instance, Stimson nds that instead
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of Ronald Reagan revolutionizing a conservative mood in the country, he rode into
the White House on a conservative wave which was backlash from the more liberal
Carter era.
Taking this same idea, we measure opinion towards income inequality as a public
mood. Even though consistent opinion questions do not exist, we can take various
questions on income inequality and code them as liberal or conservative to get a
general idea on how liberal or conservative the public is feeling towards income
inequality in a given year. This was coded by looking at questions like \Do you agree
with the following: The rich get rich, while the poor get poorer?" If the respondent
responds with \agree" or \strongly agree" then they would be considered to have
responded \liberally." Any response given that implies that income inequality is a
problem or that the government should solve it would be a liberal response. Whereas
disagreeing that it is a problem or that government involvement is needed would be
measured as a conservative response.
The percentage break down of how people respond, liberal versus conservative,
is then put into a equation using the algorithm created by Stimson (1991). The
questions are coded for the liberal response and the conservative response. Then
they are put into the equation liberal response + 100 - conservative response, which
means that in the nal series 200 is the most liberal point on the scale while 0 is
the most conservative point. This variable is measured by several questions per year
that are then combined together to get a single annual measure of the public mood
towards income inequality. This measure accurately captures when the public feels
that income inequality is an issue and when is not. This can give us closure to our
loop of opinion, representation, and redistribution even if it is not a perfect measure.
A full list of the questions used, their wording and number of times they appear
in the mood measure has been included in the appendix. The questions used in
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the mood measure do not gauge the American public's knowledge of rising income
inequality. These questions are focused on gauging if Americans see rising income
inequality as a problem in society. Some of the questions also ask the respondent
what they believe should be the government's role in addressing income inequality.
These questions can be problematic because they address the role of government
which is dierent than what we want to capture in our mood measure. However,
since we are measuring liberal and conservative responses to these questions, we




Gini Coecient. The Gini coecient is a measure of inequality and is recorded
by the United Sates federal government in the Federal Reserve Economic Database
(FRED). It is a ratio where 1 would signify that one person owns all the wealth
in a country, and 0 that everyone has a completely equal share of wealth in a given
country. It is calculated by looking at the total income distribution within a country.
In 1971 the U.S. had a Gini coecient of 0.397 in 2012 it was 0.477. The Gini
coecient serves as a proxy measure for redistribution that occurs. The Gini does
vary over the time period in the analysis which should give us insight into if actual
increases or decreases in income inequality aect opinion towards inequality.
Unemployment and Ination Rates. To measure ination, the annual ination
rate was taken from the United States economic database FRED. Likewise, the
annual unemployment rate was taken from the FRED database.
Partisan Control of the White House. This variable is a measure of which
party maintained control of the White House in any given year. The variable was
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coded 1 when a Democratic president was in oce and 0 when a Republican president
was in oce. The time series in this study covered eight presidents and ve changes
in partisan control. The series begins during Nixon's rst term and ends at the
beginning of Obama's second term.
Presidential Rhetoric. This variable was collected by manually coding the
content of major presidential addresses in every year of the dependent variable. The
speeches coded were found in the Miller Center's Presidential Speech Archive from
the University of Virginia. The coded speeches were addresses or debates given by
the president prior to or during his presidency to the American public. Presidents
like Reagan and Obama came on the political scene early and spoke at the Repub-
lic National Convention or Democratic National Convention, respectively, prior to
becoming president. Even though these men were not in oce, they were political
elites that can aect public opinion. Debates were also included because they gain
signicant media attention and often are a place where presidents or presidents to be
must market or defend their policy platforms. Speeches given to foreign government
bodies (including the U.N.) and at commemorative events over seas are not included
in the analyses because they are not highly relevant to the American people and
rarely address domestic policy.
Overall, 166 presidential speeches from Nixon to Obama were coded. A dictionary
was created from the list given in McCall 2005 (93), the terms used are in the
appendix. These 16 terms capture the most relevant speech to the concerns of
income inequality. Only one president in the data set, Clinton, used the actual term
income inequality in a national address. Text that was determined to address income
inequality was that that highlighted the dierence between income groups asthem
being unequal. For instance, to simply address the problems of the poor, does not
explicitly compare the status of the poor, compared to, or at the expense of the
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middle or upper class. This variable is measured as the number of speeches with a
mention of income inequality in a given year.
Media Mentions. This variable was collected manually through the Lexis
Nexis database. The same dictionary that was used in collecting presidential rhetoric
data was not used in nding media mentions. Searching for terms like \tax" in Lexis
Nexis over 41 years would yield thousands upon thousands of results. Instead, the
terms \income inequality" and \income gap" were searched for. These articles were
then manually coded as mentioning income inequality within the United States.
Similar to the presidential speech data, the number of mentions of income inequality
in the media in a year are summed together. The data is collected from the New
York Times and Newsweek, from 1971-2012. The number of media mentions towards
income inequality in both these news outlets were surprisingly low. The years 2012
and 2007 had the highest number of mentions with 11 news stories between the two
sources. Using only two sources is a limited measure, but both of these sources
are long standing news outlets with high readership. If they together cover a large
number of stories on income inequality, it should serve as an eective proxy for media
coverage on income inequality at large.
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3. RESULTS AND CONCLUSION
3.1 Results
3.1.1 Do Economic Factors Drive Public Mood Towards Income Inequality?
Before conducting any analysis, it is important to look at how the public
mood towards income inequality changes over time. Figure 3.1 shows us that the
public mood towards income inequality has been growing more conservative since the
Clinton years and drops o completely during Obama's presidency. The recession in
the 2000s may be responsible for the dip during Obama's tenure, but the economy was
booming under Clinton, and as previously mentioned Clinton is the only president to
address income inequality explicitly, and in a liberal tone. This move could simply be
a thermostatic response to liberal policy, which Stimson (1999) nds with his public
mood measures. As can be seen, liberal public mood towards income inequality is
highest in the Reagan and Bush years in the 1980s and early 1990s, and even rises
again during the Bush years in the early 2000s.
Table 3.1 shows the eect of macro economic conditions on the American pub-
lic's mood towards income inequality. Income inequality is an economic phenomenon,
and we should expect that as Americans experience worsening or bettering general
economic conditions, mood towards income inequality would also change. For most
Americans during the time period examined in this study, income inequality is an
abstract and not highly salient economic condition. More familiar economic condi-
tions such as unemployment and ination should help cue Americans to how they
feel the economy is doing overall, which would give insight into how they should feel
about income inequality.
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Figure 3.1: Public Mood on Income Inequality, 1971-2012
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Table 3.1: Do Economic Factors Drive Public Mood Towards Income Inequality?












Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Two-tailed hypothesis test; *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10.
Dependent Variable is Public Mood Towards Income Inequality.
The dependent variable contains a unit root which was conrmed by a Dickey-Fuller test.
This analysis and those that follow will contain a lagged dependent variable to correct for this.
any eect on the public mood towards income inequality. In fact a rise in the
Gini coecient causes a decrease, or more conservatism, although insignicant, in
public mood towards income inequality. Kelly and Enns (2010) nd that as actual
income inequality rises, \the public responds with increased conservative sentiment."
Unemployment and ination trend in the opposite direction than expected although
insignicant. This results could suggest that the ndings of Soroka and Wlezien
(2008) and Kelly and Enns (2010) are correct and that as income inequality and the
economy worsen, the public becomes more conservative about government policy.
The results in Table 3.1, while null, show us that the American public clearly gets
their attitude formation on income inequality from sources other than the current
state of the economy. Figure 2 shows us that as income inequality has steadily
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Figure 3.2: Public Mood on Income Inequality and Annual Gini Coecient, 1971-
2012
more conservative. The results from Table 3.1 and what Figure 3.2 shows suggests
that another factor besides economics is driving when Americans are concerned or
not about income inequality. The next logical place to look for answers is where
Americans nd their knowledge shortcuts, through rhetoric by political elites and
the media.
3.1.2 Do Elite and Media Cues Drive Public Mood Towards Income Inequality?
Table 3.2 shows us the eects that political and media cues have on the public's
mood towards income inequality. Depending on a president's party, we would expect
not only their rhetoric but their policy focus on redistribution to dier. Bartels
(2008) and Kelly (2009) nd that rising income inequality often coincides with when
Republican presidents are in oce, but the model shows us that with a Democrat
in oce, the American public actually becomes more conservative toward income
inequality. James Stimson's work on public mood shows that a thermostatic eect
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is possible which could cause the public to move in a conservative policy direction
even with liberal leadership.
Presidential rhetoric has almost no eect on the public's mood towards income
inequality. From the raw speech data itself, we know that president's rarely speak
of income inequality and only once in the time span of this study, did a president
actually use the words income inequality in a national address. This conrms what
much of the previous research on presidential rhetoric shows which is that presidential
speeches rarely cause the American public to have increased salience to an issue or
change their opinion.
Media mentions have a signicant and conservative eect on public mood towards
income inequality. All of the media mentions coded for this study framed income
inequality as a problem in the United States, or a liberal response. Here again we see
a possible thermostatic eect from income inequality cues by elites and the media as
these liberal mentions make Americans less concerned about income inequality.
While the results in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 contradict some theoretical expec-
tations, these are very simple models that allow us to get a glimpse at what could
possibly be driving the public's mood towards income inequality. Economic factors
had no eect on the public mood towards income inequality. A democratic president
in the White House and media mentions of income inequality make the public more
conservative or less concerned about income inequality. Kelly and Enns (2010) sug-
gest (based o Gilens 2000) that the media tends to highlight individualism which
creates a \negative link between rising inequality and public opinion liberalism."
This may be a factor in the thermostatic eect we see from presidential rhetoric and
media mentions that largely address income inequality as an issue. In Table 3.3,
the model is expanded to cover some phenomenon that may work together to shape
public mood towards income inequality.
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Table 3.2: Do Elite and Media Cues Drive Public Mood Towards Income Inequality?












Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Two-tailed hypothesis test; *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10.
Dependent Variable is Public Mood Towards Income Inequality.
3.1.3 Does Presidential Rhetoric Matter? The President's Eect on the Public
Mood of Income Inequality
We know that the party of the president matters signicantly for how the
American public views income inequality. However, we would not imagine that
Republicans and Democrats speak about income inequality the same way. This
model includes two variables that measure if the president speaks about income
inequality in a liberal or conservative manner. If we break down presidential mentions
of income inequality as conservative or liberal, can we see why the president's party
has an eect on the public mood towards income inequality? In Table 3.3, we explore
a more full model to explain what drives the public mood towards income inequality.
The Gini coecient is added to the model to capture real life income inequality in
the United States. Also added to the model is an interaction between the president's
party and presidential rhetoric.
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Table 3.3: Does Presidential Rhetoric Matter for The Mood of Income Inequality?


















Notes: Standard errors are in parentheses.
Two-tailed hypothesis test; *** = p < 0.01; ** = p < 0.05; * = p < 0.10.
Dependent Variable is Public Mood Towards Income Inequality.
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As Table 3.3 shows, parsing out if presidential mentions are conservative or
liberal does not give us anymore insight into why presidential party eects the public
mood towards income inequality. The president's party retains a signicant eect
and remains the strongest theoretical indication of how public mood towards income
inequality is formed.
3.2 Conclusion
The analysis presented in this thesis tells us a lot about what forms the pub-
lic's opinion towards income inequality. The analyses gave a lot of insignicant
eects, but this helps to show what does not drive the public mood towards income
inequality which can serve as a guideline for future research. We know that for
Americans actual economic conditions do not determine the public mood towards
income inequality. The American public often relies on cues from media and elites
when forming opinions on complicated economic matters such as income inequality.
We did nd that presidential party and media mentions do have a signicant conser-
vative eect on the public mood towards income inequality. It seems that as income
inequality is addressed more frequently by opinion leaders, the public moves into see
income inequality as less of an issue for American society. In the full model with
both economic, political, and media factors, media mentions are no longer signi-
cant, but presidential party remains the most signicant factor in determining the
public mood towards income inequality.
In the full model we also found that president party remains signicant, but what
the president is saying about income inequality, liberal or conservative, does not eect
the public mood towards income inequality. Further research should take a closer
examination of redistributive policies and their eect on income inequality. Maybe
liberal presidents address income inequality in policy therefore alleviating inequality
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and making the public less concerned. Looking at actual redistributive policies and
their outcomes could give great insight into what drives the public's mood towards
income inequality. A deeper media analysis could also give more insight into what
kind of cues Americans are getting from mainstream media about income inequality.
Public opinion towards income inequality has signicant eects on what types of
redistributive policies American citizens demand from their government. As income
inequality continues to grow, it is imperative that we understand when and why
Americans are concerned about income inequality.
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B.1 Questions in Mood Measure
Resurgent Republican Survey - 3 Points in DV
Which of the following statements comes closer to your view? Government policies
should promote fairness by narrowing the gap between rich and poor, making the
rich pay their fair share, and reducing income inequality. Government policies
should promote opportunity by fostering job growth, encouraging entrepreneurs,
and allowing hardworking people to keep more of what they earn.
Democracy Corps Poll - 2 Points in DV, Fielded 8/23/12 - 11/6/12
Now I'm going to read you some pairs of statements about the economy. For each
pair, please tell me whether the rst statement or the second statement comes
closer to your own view, even if neither is exactly right....First statement: I'm more
concerned about growing inequality, because we are turning into a country with
only very rich and very poor. Second statement: I'm more concerned that we will
go overboard, punish the rich for being successful and keep businesses from
investing and strengthening the economy....(If First/Second statement, ask:) (Is
that much or somewhat closer?)
General Social Survey - 5 Points in DV, Fielded 2/1/87 - 4/17/08
Do you agree or disagree... inequality continues to exist because it benets the rich
and powerful
General Social Survey - 3 Points in DV, Fielded 2/1/87-2/1/00 Do you agree or
disagree...inequality continues to exist because ordinary people don't join together
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to get rid of it? ...Strongly agree, agree, neither agree nor disagree, disagree,
strongly disagree
LA Times/Bloomberg - 2 Points in DV, Fielded 12/8/06 - 3/3/07
As you may know, Congress is considering various measures to reduce the growing
gap between the rich and the poor in this country. Do you think this income gap
has become a very serious problem for the nation, a somewhat serious problem, or
not too much of a problem, or not a problem at all?
ABC News/Washington Post Poll - 2 Points in DV, Fielded 1/1/78-2/1/81
I'm going to read a few statements. For each, can you please tell me if you tend to
agree or disagree with it?... The government should work to substantially reduce
the income gap between rich and poor.
Gallup - 2 Points in DV, Fielded 4/23/98 - 11/28/11
Do you think that the fact that some people in the United States are rich and other
are poor-[ROTATED: represents a problem that needs to be xed (or) is an
acceptable part of our economic system?]
American National Election Study - 3 Points in DV, Fielded 9/18/02 - 11/5/08
Do you think the dierence in incomes between rich and poor people in the United
States today is LARGER, SMALLER, or ABOUT THE SAME as it was 20 years
ago?
American National Election Study - 2 Points in DV, Fielded 9/18/02 - 11/3/04
Do you think the dierence in incomes between rich people and poor people in the
United States today is LARGER, SMALLER, or ABOUT THE SAME as it was 20
years ago? Do you think this is A GOOD THING, A BAD THING, or haven't you
thought about it?
General Social Survey - 21 Points in DV, Fielded 2/1/78 - 3/15/10
Some people think that the government in Washington ought to reduce the income
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dierences between the rich and the poor, perhaps by raising the taxes of wealthy
families or by giving income assistance to the poor. Others think that the
government should not concern itself with reducing this income dierence between
the rich and the poor. Here is a card with a scale from 1 to 7. Think of a score of 1
as meaning that the government ought to reduce the income dierences between
rich and poor, and a score of 7 meaning that the government should not concern
itself with reducing income dierences. What score between 1 and 7 comes closest
to the way you feel?
General Social Survey - 6 Points in DV, Fielded 2/1/85 - 3/10/06
On the whole, do you think it should or should not be the government's
responsibility to...reduce income dierences between the rich and poor?...Denitely
should be, probably should be, probably should not be, denitely should not be
Pew/Times Mirror - 18 Points in DV, Fielded 4/27/87 - 1/24/08
(Now I am going to read you a series of statements on some dierent topics. For
each statement, please tell me if you completely agree with it, mostly agree with it,
mostly disagree with it or completely disagree with it.)...Today it's really true that
the rich just get richer while the poor get poorer.
PRRI - 2 Points in DV, Fielded 10/10/11 - 11/7/12
(Now, as I read some statements on a few dierent topics, please tell me if you
completely agree, mostly agree, mostly disagree or completely disagree with each
one.)...The government should do more to reduce the gap between the rich and
poor.
Harris - 12 Points in DV, Fielded 12/2/99 - 7/13/10
Now I want to read you some things people have told us they have felt from time to
time. Do you tend to feel or not feel...the rich get richer and the poor get poorer?
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APPENDIX C
C.1 Correlations for Tables
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